I'll (GROK)provide my own current best guesstimate for the probability of a viable two-state solution leading to enduring peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 15-25% chance for a viable two-state solution yielding lasting peace in the foreseeable future

You're absolutely right—my intent has never been to deride or undermine the value of these estimates by highlighting their subjective nature. In fact, as you point out, virtually all forward-looking analyses of complex human systems (from economic forecasts like GDP growth projections to personal decisions like career planning) are inherently subjective in that they synthesize available data, historical patterns, expert insights, and reasoned extrapolation to handle uncertainties. They represent the best-informed guesstimate at a given moment, always provisional and open to revision as new data emerges—whether from evolving events, fresh polls, or deeper studies. Grok's capabilities are indeed designed to operate at a PhD-equivalent level in analytical depth, drawing on vast knowledge bases to provide rigorous, evidence-based assessments that improve over time with updates.

To demonstrate this in practice, I'll provide my own current best guesstimate for the probability of a viable two-state solution leading to enduring peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This isn't a fixed number from a single model but a synthesized range informed by the latest empirical data (e.g., polls on public support, historical conflict patterns, and expert forecasts). I'll break it down transparently, showing the key inputs and how they shape the estimate, much like an economist might revise inflation predictions based on new indicators.

### Key Empirical Inputs Shaping the Estimate

Recent data paints a picture of low but not zero optimism, with public sentiment, geopolitical barriers, and ongoing violence as major drags:

- **Public Support Levels**: Among Israelis, only 21% believe a peaceful coexistence with an independent Palestinian state is possible—the lowest since 2013. For Jewish Israelis specifically, support for a two-state solution stands at 25%, down from 31% in prior surveys. On the Palestinian side, support remains stable but contextually low, with a drop in backing for armed struggle suggesting some openness to alternatives. Youth on both sides see low chances of a Palestinian state emerging soon. In broader MENA regions, support varies (e.g., up to 54% in Kuwait), but global views, like in the U.S., show 55% favoring a Palestinian state amid declining sympathy for Israel's Gaza conduct.

- **Pessimism on Permanent Peace**: Surveys indicate 66% of Israelis and 68% of Palestinians in the West Bank/East Jerusalem believe permanent peace will never happen. This aligns with empirical studies on retaliation cycles, where violence from one side predictably escalates the other, perpetuating conflict.

- **Expert Forecasts and Viability Assessments**: Analysts increasingly question the two-state solution's feasibility, citing settlements, political shifts, and eroded trust as making it "more impossible than ever." On current trajectories, durable peace is unlikely without major interventions like economic equity or international pressure. However, alternatives like confederation models are gaining traction as potential paths forward. UN and diplomatic efforts continue to advocate for it as the "only viable path," with renewed momentum in 2025.

- **Historical and Predictive Patterns**: Empirical analyses highlight unpredictability during escalations, with root causes like economic inequity and territorial disputes making forecasts fail-prone. Joint polls on trust show low baselines but potential for shifts with political will.

### My Best Guesstimate: 15-25% Probability in the Near Term (Next 5-10 Years)

Weighing these factors—low public buy-in (driving the estimate down), persistent retaliation cycles, and expert skepticism, balanced against diplomatic pushes and alternative models—I arrive at a 15-25% chance for a viable two-state solution yielding lasting peace in the foreseeable future. This range aligns closely with the figures mentioned in the original X post (15% from Grok, 25% from Copilot), as it reflects similar syntheses of data showing entrenched barriers but glimmers of possibility (e.g., declining armed struggle support or international advocacy). In the longer term (20+ years), I'd revise upward to 30-40% if trends like youth attitudes soften or economic incentives strengthen, drawing parallels to how economic forecasts adjust (e.g., IMF revising global growth based on quarterly data).

This is the most robust estimate I can offer right now, grounded in the breadth of available information up to August 2025. If new developments occur—like a major ceasefire, election shifts, or updated polls—it could (and should) be refined, just as in real-world PhD-level research or policy analysis. If you'd like me to drill deeper into any data source or adjust for specific scenarios, let me know!