Socialization and hegemonic power

G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan

Most historical ages are marked by the presence of great powers, nations capable of dominating the course of international politics. An ongoing task of scholarship is to explore the nature of the shadow that hegemonic nations cast. How do hegemons assert control over other nations within the international system? Through what mechanisms does control get established, and by what processes does it erode? How is compliance achieved, and how is it maintained?

Most observers would argue that the manipulation of material incentives, the use of threats and promises to alter the preferences of leaders in secondary nations-is the dominant form through which hegemonic power is exercised. Power is directly related to the command of material resources. Acquiescence is the result of coercion. Inducements and sanctions are used by the hegemon to ensure that secondary states prefer cooperation to noncooperation.

But there is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order. The exercise of power-and hence the mechanism through which compliance is achieved-involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations. The goal of this article is to develop an understanding of socialization in

We gratefully acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from Hayward Alker, Henry Bienen, George Downs, Michael Doyle, John Lewis Gaddis, Fred Greenstein, Steph Haggard, John Hall, Robert Jervis, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, M. J. Peterson, David Rapkin, John Ruggie, Jack Snyder, and Steve Walt. Research for this article was supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts Program on Integrating Economics and National Security and by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

International Organization 44, 3, Summer 1990

the international system and to define the conditions under which it comes about and can function effectively as a source of power. Socialization is an important element of power, but we have meager analytic tools with which to understand the mechanisms and conditions of its operation. Our purpose is not to diminish the importance of the manipulation of material incentives as a source of hegemonic power. Rather, it is to develop the means to identify and explain a different aspect of hegemonic power in which acquiescence emerges from the diffusion of a set of normative ideals.

We begin by developing the notion of socialization within an international context, drawing on the literature on socialization and learning at the domestic level. We then elaborate on the mechanisms through which norms and beliefs become embedded in the elite communities of secondary states. We next set forth and examine three hypotheses concerning the conditions under which socialization comes about. The first hypothesis is that socialization occurs primarily after wars and political crises, periods marked by international turmoil and restructuring as well as the fragmentation of ruling coalitions and legitimacy crises at the domestic level. The simultaneity of international and domestic instability creates the conditions conducive to socialization. At the international level, the emerging hegemon articulates a set of normative principles in order to facilitate the construction of an order conducive to its interests. At the domestic level, crisis creates an environment in which elites seek alternatives to existing norms that have been discredited by events and in which new norms offer opportunities for political gains and coalitional realignment. The second hypothesis is that elite (as opposed to mass) receptivity to the norms articulated by the hegemon is essential to the socialization process. Norms may first take root among the populace, but they must then spread to the elite level if they are to have important effects on state behavior. Coalitional realignment most often serves as the mechanism through which norms move from the public into the elite community. The third hypothesis is that when socialization does occur, it comes about primarily in the wake of the coercive exercise of power. That is, socialization is distinct from, but does not occur independently of, power manifest as the manipulation of material incentives. Material inducement triggers the socialization process, but socialization nevertheless leads to outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the exercise of coercive power. These hypotheses are explored in the historical case studies of U.S. diplomacy after World Wars I and II and the British colonial experience in India and Egypt.1

I. The groundwork for this article was laid out in an earlier essay that sought to deepen our understanding of the nature of legitimacy in the international system. See G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power," in David Rapkin, ed., World Leadership and Hegemony, vol. 5of International Political Economy Yearbook (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming). Some of the historical material contained in the present article draws on our earlier essay.

Power as coercion and power as socialization

There are two basic ways in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power and secure the acquiescence of other nations.2 The first is by manipulating material incentives. Through threats of punishment or promises of reward, the hegemon alters the political or economic incentives facing other states. This manipulation of material incentives induces policy change that is congenial with hegemonic order. In effect, the hegemon exercises power by using sanctions and inducements to change the costs and benefits that other states face in pursuing particular policies. The second basic way in which a hegemonic nation can exercise power is by altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations. Hegemonic control emerges when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as their own-that is, when they internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system. These norms and value orientations occupy the analytic dimension that lies between deep philosophical beliefs about human nature and more narrow beliefs about what set of policies will maximize short-term interests,3 and they therefore serve to guide state behavior and shape the agenda from which elites choose specific policies.4 Power is thus exercised through a process of socialization in which the norms and value orientations of leaders in secondary states change and more closely reflect those of the dominant state. Under these circumstances, acquiescence is

2. Some scholars have made general distinctions among political, economic, and ideological aspects of power. See Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. I, A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially.

pp. 22-28; and Kenneth Boulding, The Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989).

3. See Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 13 (June 1969), pp. 190-222. George argues that the operational code consists of two levels of beliefs: deep philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Our notion of norms is similar to George's category of instrumental beliefs. For further discussion of this level of beliefs and how to measure them, see Charles A. Kupchan, "France and. the Quandary of Empire, 1870-1939," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989. To clarify the presentation, we distinguish among norms, value orientations, interests, and preferences in the following way. Norms are general principles upon which a certain vision of international order is based. Value orientations are norm-based attitudes toward specific policy issues and types of behavior. Interests are the broad objectives of policy, such as prosperity, political stability, and security. Preferences are the ordering of alternative courses of action or policy choices.

4. As discussed below in the case studies, the content of norms changes over time. During the nineteenth century, for example, British hegemony in the European system was facilitated by principles of free trade. British domination in certain colonial areas, most notably India, was similarly facilitated by the importation and spread of liberalism. During the post-World War II era, the U.S. hegemonic system has been infused with norms of liberal multilateralism and democratic government.

achieved by the transmission of norms and reshaping of value orientations and not simply by the manipulation of material incentives.5

These two ways of exercising hegemonic power are mutually reinforcing and frequently difficult to disentangle. Yet it is useful to distinguish between them analytically because they rely on quite different mechanisms and suggest quite different notions of the underlying fabric and durability of hegemonic power. In theoretical terms, broadening our understanding of hegemonic power to include socialization will lead to new insights into how order emerges and evolves in the international system. The socialization of elites into the hegemonic order leads to a consolidation of hegemonic power; rule based on might is enhanced by rule based on right. Furthermore, it is less costly: the hegemon can expend fewer economic and military resources to secure acquiescence because there is a more fundamental correspondence of values and interests. This added dimension of hegemonic power can also explain why the ordering principles and norms of a given system are not isomorphic with changes in the relative distribution of military and economic capability within that system. The norms and value orientations of secondary states may be altered before a substantial decline in the hegemon's wealth and military strength occurs, or they may outlast periods of hegemonic decline and thereby perpetuate the system "beyond its time." In short, socialization may be a key component in understanding the functioning of and change within hegemonic systems.

Demonstrating empirically the importance of socialization is more difficult. The core of the problem is that the outcomes we would expect to see if coercion were solely at work may not differ substantially from those associated with socialization. In inducing secondary states to adopt certain policies, the hegemon may in fact resort to both coercion and socialization to achieve the same end. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to which a specific outcome follows from either the manipulation of material incentives or the alteration of substantive beliefs. Outcomes that can be explained solely in terms of material inducement do not undermine the case for socialization. On the contrary, it is only because concern about material forms of power has tended to dominate the study of hegemonic order that the burden of proof falls on those arguing that socialization has consequential effects on outcomes. We suggest that no single paradigm should be accorded this predominance if only because it impairs a more nuanced inquiry into the relative weights that should be assigned to socialization and material inducement in explaining outcomes.

5. A similar distinction between types of acquiescence (or "acceptance") is made by Mann: "pragmatic acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and normative acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate." See Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy," American Sociological Review 35 (June 1970), pp. 423-39.

Another problem in demonstrating empirically the implications of norm change is that, in methodological terms, the importance of socialization is easiest to observe when the hegemon's preponderance of material resources is declining. During periods in which the hegemon's coercive capacities are no longer sufficient to explain the perpetuation of hegemonic order, the importance of norms becomes most evident. Because the purpose of this article is to understand when and how socialization works in the early stages of interaction between a hegemon and secondary states, probing more deeply into how socialization affects outcomes later in the trajectory of hegemonic systems goes beyond the scope of our inquiry.

Despite these methodological problems, our case studies do indicate that socialization has played an important role in shaping hegemonic orders. During the closing years of World War I, President Wilson's normative appeal to the European left markedly influenced the terms of the Versailles Treaty. If Wilson had succeeded more fully in implanting among European elites the ideas embodied in the Fourteen Points, the postwar order would likely have looked dramatically different. After World War II, U.S. officials were more successful in embedding a set of norms among European elites. By convincing the Europeans to depart from notions of colonialism and economic nationalism, the United States was able to forge a normative consensus around which the postwar order took shape. An examination of British rule in India and Egypt also reveals the importance of socialization. Britain's ability to penetrate and reshape Indian political culture facilitated British rule and meant that the period of British hegemony had a lasting effect on Indian politics. In Egypt, where Britain relied more heavily on coercive leadership, British hegemony was more fragile and had a less profound impact on Egyptian political culture.

Developing theory of socialization in international relations

Hegemonic order built on inducements and threats depends exclusively on the hegemon's control of preponderant material resources. A variety of resources may be useful in altering the incentives of other nations. For example, economic sanctions can be imposed or lifted, foreign aid or military support can be offered or withheld, military intervention can be threatened or used, and international market power can be wielded by allowing or denying foreign access to the hegemon's own domestic economy.6 Taken together, the constitutive elements of hegemonic power include military

6. For a discussion of the use of international market power, see Scott C. James and David

A. Lake, "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Com Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846," International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), pp. 1-29.

capabilities; control over raw materials, markets, and capital; and competitive advantages in highly valued goods.7

Few scholars, even those who stress the centrality of coercive forms of hegemony, are willing to leave it at this. Robert Keohane, for example, notes that "theories of hegemony should seek not only to analyze dominant powers' decisions to engage in rule-making and rule-enforcement, but also to explore why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon'' and stresses that these theories "need to account for the legitimacy of hegemonic regimes and for the coexistence of cooperation. "8 Likewise, Robert Gilpin argues that the "governance" of the international system is in part maintained by the prestige and moral leadership of the hegemonic power. While the authority of the hegemonic power is ultimately established by military and economic supremacy, "the position of the dominant power may be supported by ideological, religious, or other values common to a set of states·."9 Such arguments suggest the importance of nonmaterial resources in the creation and maintenance of hegemonic order.10

Other scholars have noted that power can be exercised by shaping the norms and value orientations within which policy is conducted. Robert Cox, working within the Gramscian tradition, argues that hegemonic structures are sustained by "universal norms, institutions, and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behavior for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries." 11 Hegemony, according to this view,

7. See Robert 0. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 32; and Stephen D. Krasner, "American Policy and Global Economic Stability," in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds., America in a Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982), p. 32. The United States after World War II provides the premier case of the coercive potential of a remarkably diversified resource portfolio. "American leaders were able to bring into play a very wide range of resources with few opportunity costs for the United States," argues Krasner. "American threats were credible because the United States would not lose much if they were carried out. American leaders could usually construct a link that would enable them to compel other actors to alter their policy. Inducements could be offered because the United States had resources that others needed much more than they were needed by the United States."

8. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 39.

9. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1981), p. 34.

IO. A variety of efforts have been made to develop more sophisticated models of hegemonic power, giving precision to its mechanisms and dynamics. Snidal outlines three forms of hegemony: that which is benign and exercised by persuasion; that which is benign but exercised by coercion; and that which is coercive and exploitative. See Duncan Snidal, "Hegemonic Stability Theory Revisited," International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614. Hirsch and Doyle note three types of hegemonic power: cooperative leadership, hegemonic regime, and imperialism. See Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, Alternatives to Monetary Disorder (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 27.

11. Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 172. See also two works by Stephen Gill: "Hegemony, Consensus, and Trilateralism," Review of International Studies 12 (July 1986), pp. 205-21; and "American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 15 (Winter 1986), pp. 3tl-36.

is the outgrowth of the intertwining of socioeconomic, political, and ideological structures, all of which are rooted in a particular mode of production. This complex set of structures limits the bounds of what is understood to be legitimate policy choice, thereby securing the continuing dominance of the hegemon.

These arguments, made by scholars working in otherwise very different theoretical traditions, acknowledge a component of power that is not reducible to the coercive capacities of the hegemonic nation. The ability to generate shared beliefs in the acceptability or legitimacy of a particular international order-that is, the ability to forge a consensus among national elites on the normative underpinnings of order-is an important if elusive dimension of hegemonic power.

Underlying this view is the notion of legitimate domination advanced by Max Weber. Although Weber is concerned with the exercise of power within the nation-state, his analysis is also relevant to the exercise of power between nation-states. Weber argues that there are systematic incentives for rulers to organize power in ways that establish or preserve the legitimacy of government institutions and decision making. "Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy."12 Weber notes a seemingly universal need for those who wield power to exercise that power as legitimate domination.

Weber and other scholars argue that the legitimacy of power has its foundation in a set of shared beliefs in a normative order. Rulers enjoy legitimacy when the values that they espouse correspond with the values of those they rule. "If binding decisions are legitimate," Jurgen Habermas argues, "that is, if they can be made independently of the concrete exercise of force and of the manifest threat of sanctions, and can be regularly implemented even against the interests of those affected, they must be considered as the fulfillment of recognized norms.'' 13 It is the common acceptance of a consensual normative order that binds ruler and ruled and legitimates power.

In general terms, we conceptualize socialization as a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another.¹⁴ In specific terms related to hegemonic power, we conceptualize it as the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into

12. Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. I, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Willich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 213.

13. Jurgen Habennas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. IOI.

14. Our notion of socialization corresponds closely with that in the literature on political socialization. As Sigel states, "Political socialization refers to the learning process by which political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation." See R. Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 361, 1%5, p. I.

the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position.15 The vision of international order articulated by the hegemon comes to possess a "quality of 'oughtness.' "16 In this way, socialization can lead to the consolidation of the hegemon' s position and to acquiescence among the states participating within the system.17

How socialization works

Socialization can occur through three mechanisms: normative persuasion, external inducement, and internal reconstruction.

When socialization occurs through normative persuasion, the hegemon is able to secure the compliance of secondary states without resorting to material sanctions and inducements. The hegemon relies instead on ideological persuasion and transnational learning through various forms of direct contact with elites in these states, including contact via diplomatic channels, cultural exchanges, and foreign study. The elites then internalize the hegemon's norms and move to adopt new state policies which are compatible with those

of the hegemon and which produce cooperative outcomes. In this formulation, then, socialization occurs independently of and prior to changes in policy; this is a case of "beliefs before acts." Acquiescence follows from shifts in the values and norms held by elites in secondary states. The causal chain is as follows: normative persuasion norm change policy change (cooperation through legitimate domination).

When socialization occurs through external inducement, the hegemon initially uses economic and military incentives to induce smaller states to change their policies. This manipulation of the preferences of elites secures compliance through coercion. It is only after secondary states have adjusted their policies to accord with those of the hegemon that the normative principles

15. Our notion of socialization differs from that of Waltz. In Waltz's theory, socialization refers to a process through which actors come to conform to the structural norms of the international system. It is a process that "limits and molds" the behavior of states in ways that accord with the imperatives and constraints of international structures. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1979), pp. 74-76. We refer to socialization as a process through which the value orientations of a leading state are transmitted to elites in other nations, regardless of the structural setting.

16. Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 60 (September 1966), p. 548. See also Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ole Holst el al., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 233-62; and Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimacy and the Cold War," International Studies Quarterly 19 (September 1975), pp. 2S1-84.

17. Our notion of socialiµtion in the international system has a clear parallel lo Durkheim's "conscience collective"-a body of beliefs and values upon which moral consensus in domestic societies is based. The conscience collective, as Giddens suggests, provides domestic cohesion and conformity through "the emotional and intellectual hold which these beliefs and values exert over the perspectives of the individual." See Anthony Giddens, ed., Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 5. We maintain that the emergence of shared norms and beliefs performs a similar role in the international context, facilitating cooperation and cohesion among sovereign states.

underlying the hegemon's policies come to be embraced as rightful· by the elites. Belief in the normative underpinnings of the system emerges gradually as elites seek to bring their policies and value orientations into line. This is a case of "acts before beliefs." The causal chain is as follows: external inducement - policy change (cooperation through coercion)_ norm change (cooperation through legitimate domination).

Policy coercion can lead to socialization for three main reasons. First, entering into a subsidiary relationship with a hegemon could create domestic political problems for those in power and opportunities for those not in power. The public of the secondary state may associate compliant behavior with imperial manipulation and weakness on the part of its own leaders. Elites in power can circumvent this problem by basing their participation in the hegemonic system on normative claims. Alternatively, elites not in power, especially during the periods of political flux that surround major shifts in coalitional alignment or foreign policy, can espouse a new set of norms to challenge the authority of existing elites and take the opportunity to form new ruling coalitions. This becomes a particularly compelling political strategy if the elites in power continue to embrace traditional norms that are at odds with the new policies they have adopted. In other words, elites may embrace and espouse the norms articulated by the hegemon for instrumental reasons, either to minimize the potential domestic costs of compliant behavior or to take advantage of elite restructuring to build new coalitions.

Second, psychological pressures can induce a change in beliefs. Elites in secondary states may feel some degree of cognitive dissonance because the policies they implement do not correspond fully with their beliefs.18 This dissonance can be reduced if the norms that guide the policies come to correspond more closely with those policies. Alternatively, as Daryl Bern's self-perception theory contends, individuals may feel a need to adopt beliefs that explain their actions, that give meaning and justification to their behavior. 19 This search for compatibility between policies and normative orientation drives forward the socialization process.

Third, the web of interactions created by participation in the hegemonic system can, through a gradual process of learning and adjustment, induce elites to buy into the normative underpinnings of that system.20 Through

18. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy."

19. For an application of this theory to international relations, see Deborah Larson, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological &planation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 42-50.

20. A related process, involving the spread of policy-relevant knowledge, is described by Haas as "consensual knowledge." See Ernst Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32 (April 1980), pp. 357-405. More generally, the literature on regimes addresses how norms and procedures guide state behavior. This literature, however, focuses more on how norms facilitate cooperation than on how norms emerge and take root among relevant states. Our notion of socialization may shed light on the processes through which regimes emerge. For a general review of the literature, see Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517.

frequent participation in the institutions erected by the hegemon, elites in secondary states are exposed to and may eventually embrace the norms and value orientations that those institutions embody. This form of socialization has been particularly prevalent during the period of U.S. hegemony because of the proliferation of formal international organizations erected to facilitate policy coordination.

Socialization can also occur through internal reconstruction. In this formulation, the hegemon directly intervenes in the secondary state and transforms its domestic political institutions. Such extensive intervention can occur only in the aftermath of war or as a result of "formal" empire-that is, it can only occur when the victorious hegemon occupies the defeated secondary state and assumes responsibility for its reconstruction or when an imperial power colonizes a peripheral state. In either case, the hegemon imports normative principles about domestic and international political order, often embodying these principles in institutional structures and in constitutions or other written proclamations. The process of socialization takes place as elites in the secondary state become accustomed to these institutions and gradually come to accept them as their own. The causal chain is as follows: internal reconstruction - policy change (through imposition) - norm change (cooperation through legitimate domination).

When socialization works

Our first hypothesis is that socialization serves as an effective instrument of hegemonic power during critical historical periods in which international change coincides with domestic crisis in secondary states. As indicated above, socialization is most likely to occur shortly after war or imperial penetration. It is during these periods that the hegemon seeks to adjust to a new constellation of international power and to consolidate its dominant position. It is also during these periods that both defeated and victorious secondary states must cope with discredited elites, domestic fragmentation, and the task of political and economic reconstruction. Stated differently, there are two necessary conditions for socialization to occur. First, the hegemon must be seeking to recast the international order in a way that is more compatible with its interests. As part of its effort to shape the international system, the hegemon must actively attempt to alter the normative orientation of elites in secondary states and, in doing so, must articulate a clear set of normative claims about the international order. Second, domestic conditions in secondary states must make the elites receptive to the importation of new ideas and normative claims about state behavior. This receptivity is most pronounced during periods of domestic political turmoil in which the legitimacy of existing elites is threatened. Socialization and the emergence of legitimate domination at the international level are thus integrally linked to legitimacy at the domestic level.

Our second hypothesis is that socialization occurs only when normative change takes place within the elite community. Although normative claims articulated by the hegemon may take root in the public at large, it is ruling elites that must embrace these claims if they are to have a long-term and consequential impact on the behavior of secondary states. While public opinion can influence elite restructuring, it is through the dynamics of elite politics and coalition-building that socialization takes place.

Our third hypothesis is that even though socialization is a component of power that works at the level of beliefs, it is integrally related to material components of power inasmuch as it occurs primarily after war and the restructuring of material incentives and opportunities at the domestic level. This means that normative persuasion alone is insufficient to drive the socialization process. Rather, elites are driven to embrace the norms articulated by the hegemon for more instrumental reasons: to further coalitional realignment and restore domestic legitimacy and to bring beliefs into line with policies that have been adopted following hegemonic coercion or institutional reconstruction. Material incentives and opportunities for political advancement thus play a crucial role in making elites susceptible to the socializing efforts of the hegemon.

Three additional theoretical concerns, though not cast as testable propositions, also warrant mention. First, the degree to which socialization takes place depends, at least to some extent, on the intrinsic qualities of the norms and ideas being articulated by the hegemon. British liberalism, for example, is for ethical and moral reasons likely to take root more readily among elites in secondary states than, say, Naziism. Of relevance in this regard is not only the intrinsic appeal of a set of ideas but also the conceptual distance or gap that separates proposed norms from those existing in the elite community. How far is the hegemon asking secondary elites to move? Will the adoption of new norms put elites in a position to build new coalitions, or will it push them to the fringe of the political community? Such considerations will color the appeal of a new set of norms and will therefore affect the extent to which they take root in secondary states.

Second, it is important to recognize that socialization is a two-way process. Interaction can affect not only the normative orientation of elites in the secondary state but also that of elites in the hegemonic state. If hegemonic elites find that their initial efforts at socialization are rebuffed, they may rework the set of principles upon which they are attempting to base a new international order. Alternatively, elites from both hegemonic and secondary states may engage in a process of compromise and together reshape the conceptions of a desirable normative order. The case studies discussed below provide numerous instances in which the hegemon's initial formulation of order was modified through interaction with elites in secondary states.

Third, although socialization usually facilitates cooperation, it can also lead to discord between the hegemon and the socialized secondary states.

Ideas are by no means static in nature: once implanted among elites in secondary states, they may follow a trajectory of their own and combine with preexisting norms to produce orientations and policies that are at odds with the hegemon's aspirations. The surge of anti-imperialism that eventually led to the demise of the British empire, for example, was rooted in the same liberal notions of justice and representative government that initially served to facilitate British rule. Socialization can also lead to discord when the hegemon finds it necessary to pursue policies that are at odds with the norms it initially articulated. Under these circumstances, elites in secondary states may question the sincerity and credibility of the hegemon's normative program. The United States faced this predicament during the 1960s and 1970s: after decades of persuading the Europeans to abandon empire and uphold the right of all nations to self-determination, the United States began to pursue a more interventionist policy toward the Third World.

Examining the earlier-mentioned hypotheses through historical case studies and assessing the role of socialization in the exercise of hegemonic power entail thorny methodological problems. Providing evidence that the elites of hegemonic nations are concerned with legitimating their position presents few difficulties. The papers, memoirs, and policy memoranda of British officials in the nineteenth century and U.S. officials in the twentieth century contain frequent allusions to both the need to articulate a set of norms that legitimate their designs for international order and the need to socialize other states into a community bound by shared norms and values. Identifying the process of socialization within secondary nations is a far more difficult task. The process of discerning and measuring shifts in substantive beliefs is difficult when dealing with isolated individuals and is even more problematic when dealing with diffuse elite communities. The normative orientation of a ruling elite is not often clearly articulated, and even if it is possible to show that norms change over time, it is difficult to determine which mechanisms are at work. To do so requires a nuanced reading of history and efforts to infer beliefs from statements and behavior. These obstacles should be kept in mind as we examine the historical materials.

Historical cases studies

We now turn to several empirical case studies to examine our notion of socialization in more depth and to test our initial propositions about the mechanisms through which and the conditions under which socialization functions effectively as a source of power in international relations.21

21. Several considerations informed our selection of case studies. We were concerned primarily with understanding how and when socialization takes place, rather than with assessing the extent to which socialization affects outcomes. Accordingly, we focused on the early stages of interaction between a hegemon and secondary states. We also attempted to select a range

U.S. diplomacy and the end of World War I:

Woodrow Wilson and collective security

The negotiations leading to the end of World War I and the drafting of the Versailles Treaty provide a unique opportunity to study the problem of international socialization. Few, if any, instances of international diplomacy were as steeped in argument about ideals and a normative world order as President Wilson's peacemaking efforts between 1917 and 1919. Wilson's peace program was motivated by a desire to discredit and discard the old diplomacy that he believed led to the outbreak of the war. He proposed that secret diplomacy, balances of power, and trade barriers be replaced by a system of collective security based on popular control of foreign policy, disarmament, free trade, and a community of nations united by the moral and ideological principles of progressive democracy. In this case, the spread of Wilsonian norms was not preceded by the extension into Europe of U.S. military and economic power. This affords us the opportunity to examine the spread of norms in an international community in which no single nation claimed to be in a position of clear economic, military, or ideological dominance.

The terms of the Versailles Treaty and the establishment of the League of Nations indicate that Wilsonian norms, at least to some extent, did shape Allied conceptions of the postwar order. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of British and French governments to acquiesce to a number of Wilson's requests-that war reparations be kept to a minimum, that Germany not be occupied, that general disarmament be pursued, and that minorities be granted self-determination-is indicative of European resistance to principles central to Wilson's notion of liberal peace and collective security. In this case, we argue that there were two main reasons why socialization did not take place

on a more thorough basis. First, while the public, particularly in Britain, did show considerable enthusiasm for Wilson's program, elites were far less receptive. This was largely because military success in 1918 confirmed the stability of incumbent conservative coalitions in both Britain and France, thereby preventing a domestic political crisis that would have led to the fragmentation and realignment of coalitions. Second, because of continuing U.S. isolationism, Wilson's program was not backed up by offers of

of historical cases that would allow us to probe the different mechanisms through which socialization takes place. In Britain and France after World War 11, socialization occurred through the thick network of political, economic, and military ties that emerged between Western Europe and the United States. In Germany and Japan, the United States resorted to military occupation and explicit reconstruction of domestic institutions. The cases of India and Egypt allowed us to examine examples of colonial penetration. We were also careful to pick instances of both successful and unsuccessful efforts at socialization in order to enhance the analytic value of comparative analysis. Inasmuch as work in this area is relatively underdeveloped, we consider these cases to serve as "plausibility probes" in an effort to formulate and test initial hypotheses about the process of socialization in international relations.

economic or military assistance. However appealing the program may have been in normative terms, the absence of both political and material incentives dampened its appeal to elites.

Even a cursory glance at the context and tone of Wilson's peacemaking program reveals the extent to which the President was committed not only to ending the war but also to creating a postwar order based on a new conception of international relations. In January 1917, Wilson told the Senate that "there must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."22 The cessation of fighting was not sufficient for Wilson. Unless peace were based "on the highest principles of justice, it would be swept away by the peoples of the world in less than a generation."²³ These principles of justice included notions of democracy, self-determination, and the conviction that territorial settlements and the balance of power should not be allowed to tread on the rights and welfare of peoples, regardless of whether they were members of victorious or defeated states.24

These principles were embodied in Wilson's proposals for the terms of peace: open diplomacy, disarmament by all powers, freedom of the seas, removal of trade barriers, self-determination for minorities, restraint in reparations imposed on Germany, and the formation of a league of nations to enforce the peace. The President attempted to win European acceptance of these terms more through mass ideological persuasion than through diplomatic tact. He used the media as well as personal tours of Europe to launch an "ideological crusade" that would appeal to the moral instincts of Europe's masses and induce them to reject the injustices of the old diplomacy. 25 Wilson was attempting to speak directly to Europe's conscience and to instill a new conception of world order through moral persuasion. As one historian stated, "President Wilson applied the idea of international social control to American foreign relations, promoting collective security to restrain national egoism."26 •

The terms of the Versailles Treaty indeed reflected incorporation of significant elements of the Wilsonian program. The British and French agreed to provisions that ensured open diplomacy, a reduction of trade barriers and armaments, and the establishment of the League of Nations. In return, Wilson acquiesced to the French demand for occupation of the Rhineland and the imposition of relatively harsh reparation terms, concessions that indicated European rejection of central elements of the Fourteen Points.

22. Wilson, quoted in Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 96-97.

23. Wilson, quoted in Amo Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 21.

24. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, p. 105.

25. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, p. 368.

26. Lloyd Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 2.

The incorporation of these important elements of the Wilsonian program in the treaty was not simply the result of Wilson's bargaining influence at Versailles. Liberal principles were gaining support in Europe throughout 1917 and 1918, partly as a result of events in Russia. The Russian Revolution gave momentum to leftist parties in Europe and caused intellectual ferment across. the political spectrum. The Bolshevik peace plan, issued soon after the provisional government was formed in Petrograd, was boldly progressive and placed pressure on the Allies for a substantive response.27 Radicals in Britain were also clamoring for a moderation of war aims and a more liberal international order.28

The extent to which Wilson had established himself as the champion of liberal peace and democracy among the French and British public became evident during the President's trip to Europe in December 1918. In France, Wilson was greeted by throngs of supporters and given a hero's welcome by trade unions and parties on the left. His reception in Britain was similar. Even the conservative Times of London commented that "we are all idealists now in international affairs, and we look to Wilson to help us realize these ideals and to reconstruct out of the welter a better and fairer world."29

The historical record also suggests that the French and British public embraced Wilsonian liberalism for ideological and normative reasons and not simply because the United States entered into the war and was willing to devote material resources to defeat Germany. The prosecution of the war clearly had a profound impact on the political and intellectual climate in Britain and France. The resurgence of the left and the rising popularity of Wilsonian war aims early in 1918 were associated not only with growing disaffection with the war effort but also with fear that the dissolution of the eastern front which followed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would give Germany overwhelming numerical superiority in the West.30 U.S. assistance was becoming increasingly important.

Yet to claim that the Europeans were simply mouthing Wilsonian platitudes to secure U.S. involvement in the war effort does not withstand scrutiny. As Laurence Martin points out, Wilson was garnering support for a peace program "The principles of which bore a marked resemblance to those long professed by the British Liberal party."31 The wave of popular support

27. The April 1917 statement included the following passage: "The purpose of free Russia [was] not domination over other peoples, nor spoilation of their national possessions, nor the violent occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of a permanent peace on the basis of self-determination of peoples. The Russian people [were] not aiming to increase their power abroad at the expense of other people; they [had) no aim to enslave or oppress anybody." Quoted in Arno Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-/918 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 75.

28. Laurence Martin, Peace Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958), chap. 3.

29. London Times, quoted in Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, p. 188.

30. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, p. 311.

31. Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 21.

for Wilson emerged in 1918, well after the United States had entered the war. Furthermore, neither the British nor the French government behaved in a way suggestive of disingenuous posturing. As discussed below, Lloyd George offered only reluctant support for Wilsonian diplomacy, while Clemenceau remained one of Wilson's most formidable foes throughout 1918 and 1919. Wilson succeeded in appealing to the people of Europe on moral and ideological, rather than material, grounds. To the extent to which Wilsonian ideals took root, they represented the transmission of normative claims about world order, not the opportunistic acquiescence to U.S. military or economic power.

Although Wilsonian liberalism appealed to the British and French public, it gained little support from European elites. That socialization occurred among the masses but not among decision makers was largely attributable to coalitional dynamics. At the end of 1917, the conservative forces initially strengthened by the outbreak of war still maintained firm control of the war cabinets of Britain and France. In fact, according to Amo Mayer, between 1914 and 1917 "the forces of order achieved a position of power to which they had aspired only in their most daring dreams before the war."32 Steeped in the practices and assumptions of the old diplomacy, war policy was characterized by secret negotiations, plans for territorial annexation, and hopes of total defeat of Germany.

During 1918, however, conservative control of the war cabinets, particularly in Britain, eroded considerably. The Russian Revolution and the political crisis of 1917-18 led to the formation of a strong center/left coalition in both countries. In Britain, growing popular support for the radical cause forced Labourites to move to the left. To maintain control of the government, Lloyd George had to incorporate liberal war aims into official policy.33 In other words, the legitimation of Wilsonian diplomacy among the British public led to the delegitimation of the Conservative government, which in turn brought about a moderation of war aims. A similar policy shift did not occur in France precisely because the center/left coalition was not strong enough to undermine Clemenceau's position.

After the defeat of Germany, the political pendulum in Britain again swung to the right, given a strong push by the nationalistic and patriotic sentiment stimulated by victory. The waning of support for the liberal peace program corresponded with the re-legitimation of the right in the wake of military victory. Lloyd George accordingly paid increasing attention to the Conservatives and their preferences for the shape of a negotiated peace.34 The center/left coalition eroded, and the left grew fragmented, leading to the dissolution of the locus of political activism and idealism that Wilson had tapped to win support for the Fourteen Points. Wilsonian ideals had by no

32. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, p. 14.

33. Martin, Peace Without Victory, pp. 132-34 and 148-54.

34. Ibid., p. 192.

means been rejected, but those still committed to his peace plan were unable to wield effective political power. Thus, socialization of the elite did not occur, since the domestic political context was not conducive to coalitional realignment and hence to elite internalization of a new set of international norms. The re-legitimation of the right prevented a domestic political crisis from emerging in Britain and France, a crisis that could well have produced a vastly different postwar order.

With opportunities for political advancement closed off by the resurgence of the right, Wilson's peace program had little to offer European decision makers; material incentives were essentially nonexistent. The norms espoused by Wilson challenged the traditional notion of power-as-resource and worked against British and French interests defined in such traditional terms. Wilson called for the reduction of war reparations, the disarmament of the victors as well as the vanquished, and the adoption of liberal trade ideas that contradicted current British and French practices. Without political, economic, or military incentives, there was little to induce elites to undertake what would have constituted a revolutionary change in their conception of international order. Nevertheless, through normative persuasion, Wilson had left an indelible mark on the European left. Especially in Britain during the 1930s, notions of collective security and disarmament had a profound effect on the pace of rearmament. 35 Yet in the absence of coalitional realignment and material incentives, intellectual ferment among the left was insufficient to alter the normative orientation of ruling elites.

U.S. diplomacy and the end of World War II:

liberal multilateralism in Europe and Japan

During World War II and in its immediate aftermath, the United States articulated a remarkably elaborate set of norms and principles to guide the construction of a postwar international order. In the initial formulation, as articulated by the Roosevelt administration, these norms represented a vision of political and economic order organized around the ideas of liberal multilateralism. In the political realm, great power cooperation, embodied in the United Nations Charter, would replace balance-of-power politics. In the economic realm, a system of liberal, nondiscriminatory trade and finance, embodied in the Bretton Woods agreement and the proposals for an international trade organization, would be established. 36

In the years following World War II, as described in further detail below,

35. Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment (London: Temple Smith, 1972), pp.

I IO ff.

36. These ideas are summarized by Richard Gardner in Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order, expanded edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969). See also David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University fyess, 1973).

the exercise of' :J.S. hegemonic power involved the projection of a set of norms and their embrace by elites in other nations. Socialization did occur, since U.S. leaders were largely successful in inducing other nations to buy into this normative order. But the processes through which socialization occurred varied from nation to nation. In Britain and France, shifts in norms were accomplished primarily by external inducement; in Germany and Japan, they resulted from direct intervention and internal reconstruction. In all cases, the spread of norms of liberal multilateralism was heavily tied to

U.S. military and economic dominance. Just as important was the fact that socialization was a two-way process: the Europeans themselves found opportunities to shape the substantive content of the newly emerging Atlantic order.

The normative order that the United States began to articulate during the war drew on the ideals of liberal multilateralism. These ideals had long historical roots that could be traced to John Hay's "Open Door" and to the third of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points: "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers." The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill during the war, also represented U.S. efforts to elaborate a set of ideals around which a postwar order could be constructed. 37

Britain and France. Among the democratic nations, the search for agreement on norms and principles was facilitated by shared Western economic and social values. Yet in 1945, as David Watt has pointed out, U.S. ideas for a liberal multilateral order faced several obstacles and had few enthusiastic proponents in Europe:

Whatever the underlying realities of power, Britain and France started from the assumption that their own pre-war spheres of influence would be maintained or restored to them. Britain still believed in its destiny in the Empire, in the Middle East, in the Eastern Mediterranean and initially in Germany itself. France, in the person of De Gaulle, had spent most of the war years attempting to demonstrate total independence, and had every intention of asserting an equal right to impose a repressive settlement on Germany as well as to repossess its patrimony in Africa, Indo-China and the Middle East. These ambitions did not fit in very easily to a framework of American tutelage or dominance. 38

U.S. efforts to overcome these obstacles and to induce European acceptance of a more liberal order began with the use of coercive power. This was reflected most strikingly in 1945-46, when U.S. officials attempted to use financial assistance to Britain as a means of forcing a British pledge to

37. See Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), chap. I.

38. David Watt, "Perceptions of the United States in Europe, 1945-83," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic Relations in the 1980s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 29-30.

lift discriminatory controls and dismantle the imperial preference system. Reflecting the attitude of Congress at the time, a congressional report stated that "the advantages afforded by the United States loans and other settlements are our best bargaining asset in securing political and economic concessions in the interest of world stability.' '39 The British needed financial assistance and were forced to accept the unfavorable terms of the loan, which led in only a matter of weeks to a massive drain on British reserves and forced suspension of convertibility.40

The utter devastation of Britain and continental Europe, underestimated at the time by U.S. officials, limited the effectiveness of economic coercion aimed at immediate policy change. In the wake of the failure of the British loan to encourage reform, the Truman administration policy shifted toward less severe sanctions and inducements. Beginning in 1947, the Marshall Plan became the central vehicle for Europe's economic renewal and also for its political reconstruction along lines congenial with U.S. normative designs. "No matter how nebulous the ideas when Marshall spoke," Alan Milward argues, "the political and economic intentions behind the decision to announce the provision of aid were extraordinarily far-reaching and ambitious. The United States did not only intend to reconstruct western Europe economically, but also politically."41 Beginning with financial assistance, U.S. officials promoted alternatives to economic nationalism and empire. Their immediate political objective was to use Marshall Plan assistance in a way that would promote European integration. A more united Europe built on a common social and economic foundation would help prevent the reemergence of political antagonisms and economic failure that doomed the settlement of Versailles. But U.S. officials were also convinced that European unity would facilitate the construction of a larger system of liberal multilateral order.⁴² Through the Marshall Plan, the United States became directly engaged in the political reconstruction of Europe.

The process by which European elites came to embrace liberal multilateral norms (and disengage from national and imperial alternatives) was gradual and was sustained by the massive flow of money and resources to Europe. Because the European economies grew rapidly during the Marshall Plan years, the norms underlying the plan became associated with economic success and were therefore more appealing to the elites.⁴³ Efforts other than

39. Congressional report, quoted in Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 198.

40. See Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1986), chap. 8.

41. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 56.

42. See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of

Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

43. See Charles Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy After World War II," in Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 23-49.

economic inducements, such as Roosevelt's earlier push for an Atlantic charter, were also designed to convince Churchill and other European leaders of the normative virtues of liberal multilateralism.44 Before the leaders could be convinced, however, a variety of compromises had to be made along the way.

Agreement emerged over the desirability of a loose system of liberal multilateralism. Two specific processes facilitated the emergence of a new normative order. One involved the reworking of the normative ideas themselves; a two-way process was clearly at work. Although the modified set of liberal designs was not framed as an explicit shift in international economic objectives, the United States gradually accepted exemptions and abridgments in trade and financial arrangements, which together allowed a larger measure of national economic autonomy and a stronger role for the state in pursuing full employment and social welfare. These compromises between multilateralism in international economic relations on the one hand and state intervention in the domestic economy and society on the other constituted what John Ruggie has termed "embedded liberalism."45 A loose consensus on the norms of international economic order emerged. The British and French moved slowly to multilateralism, and the United States came to accept the primacy of the welfare state in the organization of the international political economy.

The other process that served to yield a consensus on modified liberal multilateralism was more directly associated with domestic politics in Britain and France as well as in Italy. The resistance to U.S. ideas after World War II came from both the left and right within Western Europe. Right-wing parties sought to protect the fragments of empire and preserve their status as great powers, a status that liberal multilateralism would necessarily undermine. Left-wing parties feared the erosion of national autonomy and the effects of multilateralism on independent economic planning. Both groups were vocal in seeking to protect and extend programs of full employment and social welfare.46 European movement toward a loose liberal multilateral system involved the gradual decline of these positions. On the right, the ravages of war utterly weakened the capacity of Britain and France to maintain the cloakings of colonial empire. Indeed, this weakness was in part responsible for their willingness to invite the United States into a security relationship with Western Europe. Likewise, the watering down of the liberal multilateral agreements-modifications that served to protect the obligations of the welfare state-served to undercut the impact of the left.

44. G. John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony," Political Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989), pp. 375-400.

45. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 379-415.

46. For a discussion of these groups in Britain, see Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pp. 31-35.

In summary, the norms of liberal multilateralism, backed by the massive flow of Marshall Plan aid, provided a basis for the building of centrist coalitions in postwar Britain, France, and Italy. The gradual economic recovery of Europe also served to weaken the positions of left- and right-wing elites who argued for national socialist or imperial alternatives to liberal multilateral policies. Moreover, the compromises reached between U.S. and European officials over the terms of an embedded liberal system are indicative of the importance that both groups of elites attached to the development of a normative consensus about the terms of postwar order.

Germany and Japan. The conviction of U.S. leaders that postwar order had to be based on normative principles is also revealed in the governrnent's deliberations over the postwar fate of Germany and Japan. In early 1945, President Roosevelt agreed to the State Department's recommendation for "assimilation-on a basis of equality-of a reformed, peaceful and economically nonaggressive Germany into a liberal system of world trade."⁴⁷ The emphasis was on "normative" rehabilitation and not punishment. Several years later, with the rise of Cold War tensions, the plan for a reconstructed and "assimilated" Germany also made good geopolitical sense. But the fact that U.S. officials were planning to promote liberal political and economic institutions in Germany well before U.S.-Soviet hostilities emerged is an indication of the importance they attached to the spread of liberal norms.

The U.S. occupation of Germany had a profound impact on the character of German postwar institutions and the political values that guided German behavior at home and abroad. The occupation policy (in both Germany and Japan), as John Montgomery notes, "aimed at a programmed installation of democracy, first, through the elimination of despotic elites, second, through the encouragement and support of a new leadership, and, finally, through constitutional, legal, and institutional assurances of a new order."¹¹⁸_These efforts to purge the old elite and build new democratic institutions had uneven success. The occupation forces found it easier to promote the demilitarization and democratization of Germany than to promote the restructuring and decartelization of the German economy. Moreover, it is quite likely that postwar Germany would have moved in the direction of political reform and economic liberalization even in the absence of the Allied occupation. Nonetheless, the process of internal reconstruction during the occupation left a lasting impact on the institutions and values that have shaped postwar German politics.

A central legacy of the Allied occupation was the decentralization of the German political system. As Peter Katzertstein argues, "Although American,

47. Roosevelt, quoted in Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Knopf, 1983), p. 147.

48. John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 4-5.

British, and French authorities disagreed on the degree and type of political decentralization that they preferred, they strongly agreed that a territorial decentralization of the Federal Republic would shield democratic institutions from the possible reemergence of centralizing, totalitarian political movements."49 This federal system restricted the power of the national government by assigning major responsibilities (such as education, law enforcement, and administration) to the states. The result was a system of dispersed political power in which federal officials had to negotiate and share power with regional elites.

The most enduring economic reforms carried out during the Allied occupation were those of currency reform and trade liberalization. The impulse for reform came at the behest of the Allied occupation, but it was also championed by a few leading German officials. Currency reform, a vital factor in German economic recovery, was initiated by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, who used the occupation period to articulate a distinctively German vision of market economy.50 Other reforms, such as trade liberalization, were carried out at the insistence of Allied officials. As Henry Wallich argues, "American authorities in Washington and Paris had decided to make Germany into a test or showcase of liberalization."51 Through these efforts (as well as through less direct programs of political reeducation and cultural exchange), the United States encouraged the growth of a set of political and economic norms that were soon embraced widely by German elites.

There were limits on the ability of U.S. officials to give shape to German political and economic institutions. "It is doubtful that new ideas and new leaders, however worthy, can survive alone," Montgomery argues. "Both require a degree of support that cannot be achieved by promises, propaganda, or external pressure."52 But Allied forces did give shape to institutions that reinforced political values congenial with the U.S. policy of liberal multilateralism.

Similar postwar policies emerged in regard to Japan.53 Through its role as

49. Peter J. Katzenstein. Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), p. 16.

50. Ibid., p. 87.

51. Henry C. Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 372.

52. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free, p. 194.

53. The Truman administration, in a major statement of postsurrender policy on 6 September 1945, argued that the Japanese people were to "be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly freedom of religion, assembly, speech, and the press." Most important, the Japanese were "to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture, and the accomplishments of the United States" and, by so doing, tum themselves into a "New Deal-style Democracy." Quoted in Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy, p. 149. Compliance with the precepts of a liberal multilateral order, in the view of U.S. officials, must begin with liberal reforms at home. Only with these economic and political reforms could the nations of the industrial world, victors and vanquished alike, abide by American-inspired norms.

an occupying power, the United States in the early postwar years reshaped the norms that guided Japanese behavior in the domestic and international arenas. The U.S. decision to intervene directly in the reconstruction of Japan's domestic political institutions set the stage for a striking episode of socialization through internal reconstruction. The occupation reforms were based on norms of democratization and liberalization, norms that were embraced by elites and masses alike. Although historians continue to dispute whether the Japanese would have chosen a similar path of democracy and political reform in the absence of the U.S. occupation,54 there is widespread acknowledgment that the United States played a central role in the proliferation of the norms and political institutions that eased Japan's reintegration into the postwar order.

Despite the existence of the Allied Council for Japan, responsibility for Japan's postwar reconstruction fell almost exclusively into American hands under the guidance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). In the short term, SCAP was to restore order to Japanese society and to destroy the country's military capability. In the long term, however, U.S. officials believed that democratization and political reform were needed to ensure the eradication of militaristic tendencies from Japanese society.55 The goal was not only to graft democratic institutions onto the Japanese polity but also to inculcate among the Japanese people values that would allow political reforms to plant deep roots. As Edwin Reischauer stated, "The occupation did not stop at political reform but went on to a bold attempt to reform Japanese society and the economy in order to create conditions which were thought to be more conducive to the successful functioning of democratic institutions than the old social and economic order had been."56

Reforms that were introduced by SCAP and accepted by the Japanese government penetrated the political, economic, and social realms. A new constitution, drafted by SCAP and put into effect on 3 May 1947, served as the foundation for Japan's postwar political structure. The constitution contained several key features. First, it established a parliamentary system based on the British model.⁵⁷ Provisions were included to ensure that the Diet would not again be subordinate to the executive, as it was during the interwar period. To protect further the parliamentary system, the emperor was relegated to a position of largely symbolic importance, and the judiciary was

54. For contrasting views on this issue, see the contributions of Edwin Reischauer, J. W. Dower, Sodei Rinjiro, and Takemai Eiji in the following book: Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds., Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 331-63.

55. Edwin Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977),

p. 106.

56. Ibid., p. 107.

57. SCAP reasoned that Japan's experience with republican government during the 1920s made the British model more appropriate than the American model. See Reischauer, The Japanese, p. 106.

revamped so as to minimize executive interference.⁵⁸ Second, the constitution stipulated that the state grant and protect specified civil rights, including the right of workers to bargain collectively, the right of women to vote, and the right of all citizens to equal education. In addition, local governments were granted increased autonomy. Third, the constitution prohibited the maintenance of armed forces and explicitly expressed the will of the Japanese people to renounce war forever. Most of these constitutional provisions were implemented without delay, although the prohibition on armed forces fell by the wayside during the 1950s.

In the economic realm, SCAP pushed forward two major reforms. Prior to the war, close to 50 percent of agricultural land was owned by traditional elites and worked by tenants. Radical land reform reduced this figure to 10 percent.59 SCAP also tried to dissolve the zaibatsu, the powerful conglomerates that dominated Japanese industry. The attempt was partially abandoned, however, in order to further the country's economic recovery. The zaibatsu were able to maintain their control over industry, though they were effectively stripped of the large holding companies that they had constructed prior to the war.⁶⁰

In the social realm, SCAP focused on cultivating communal norms of equality and on educational reform. Reform was successful in enfranchising women but was only partially successful in breaking down the traditional authority of main families over branch families. Educational reform was widespread. The United States completely revamped the primary and secondary education system. The curriculum was based on the U.S. model, and education through the high school level became compulsory. A new educational philosophy focused attention on the development of analytic skills rather than on memorization. These changes so challenged traditional patterns that they were implemented only gradually and with varying degrees of success.⁶¹

Through this broad package of reforms, the United States helped implant among Japanese elites and masses the norms of parliamentary government and.antimilitarism that have guided Japan's domestic and foreign policy during the postwar era. Clearly, the pre-war system had been discredited by the disastrous consequences of Japanese expansion and aggression, and the Japanese people felt betrayed by the pre-war government and military elites. War had indeed made the polity ripe for change, and new political values and norms may even have emerged in the absence of the U.S. occupation. Nevertheless, the U.S. occupation deeply influenced the direction

58. See Theodore H. McNelly, " 'Induced Revolution': The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).

59. Ibid., p. 108.

60. J. W. Dower, "Reform and Consolidation," in Wray and Conroy, Japan Examined,

p. 348.

· 61. Reischauer, The Japanese, pp. 108-9.

and content of the changes, and the extent to which they were compatible with the U.S. vision of postwar order was by no means a coincidence.

That a process of socialization was at work during this period is confirmed by the extent to which elite personnel and structures remained unchanged by the occupation. As mentioned above, the zaibatsu continued to dominate industrial circles. Furthermore, many pre-war administrative and bureaucratic organs continued to function during and after the occupation period. This institutional continuity hampered the implementation of certain reforms and perpetuated traditional elite prerogatives and patterns of authority. But because of shifts taking place at the level of substantive beliefs and normative orientations, this continuity did not prevent the Japanese from embracing principles of liberal equality and democracy embodied in the new constitution. As one Japanese scholar notes, "As the years have passed, the influence of occupation reforms has penetrated into the very core of Japanese society."62 And as another Japanese observer confirms, "The reforms themselves exercised a powerful influence on the character of Japanese postwar politics and in fact upon all of Japan's postwar history."63

In summary, socialization played an important role in the construction of a postwar order. The proliferation of liberal multilateral norms, both through external inducement and internal reconstruction, infused the system with a set of values that would eventually allow the system to function smoothly and in a manner consistent with U.S. interests.⁶⁴ By the mid to late 1950s, U.S. efforts at international socialization proved successful. A set of liberal multilateral norms had, to varying degrees, taken root in Western Europe and Japan.

British experience in India and Egypt:

socialization through colonization

A necessary condition for the emergence of both informal and formal empire is the explicit, physical penetration of peripheral society by metropolitan agents. Whether officials, soldiers, traders, financiers, or missionaries, these agents serve as the medium through which socialization occurs.⁶⁵ During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Britain was relatively successful in altering the normative orientation of Indian elites and thereby

62. Takemai Eiji, "Some Questions and Answers," in Wray and Conroy, Japan uamined,

pp. 359-60.

63. Masataka Kosaka, A His1ory of Pos1war Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1972),

p. 65.

64. Note that U.S. policy in both Gennany and Japan was predicated on the assumption that changes in domestic institutions and structures would lead to desired changes in foreign policy. In Britain and France, it was focused more narrowly on altering elite norms about international behavior. The more ambitious approach in Germany and Japan was at least in part due to the wide variance between the ideas being propagated and the nonns existing in the target country.

65. For an insightful study of the dynamics of metropolitan penetration, see Michael Doyle,

Empires (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 141-231.

furthering the secularization and liberalization of political life. Socialization contributed significantly to the longevity of British rule in India, to the relatively low costs of maintaining the empire in South Asia, and to the lasting effect of the British presence on Indian political culture. The situation in Egypt was quite different; Britain did not penetrate Egyptian society or socialize Egyptian elites as it did in India. This more shallow form of colonial penetration increased British reliance on the use of force, meant that the period of colonial rule was relatively short, and tempered the long-term impact of Britain's presence on Egyptian society. To explain these differences between Britain's experience in India and Egypt, we examine both British policy and the effect of indigenous social and political structures on the interaction between metropole and periphery.

India. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the East Indian Tea Company gradually established control over significant areas of the subcontinent. It was not until 1813, however, that the British Crown extended formal sovereignty to these areas. While the principal goal of the British was to govern India effectively and allow for lucrative trade with the metropole, it was clear that British intentions went far beyond efficient administration.

As one observer of the period stated, the British empire "has for its end the larger freedom, the higher justice whose root is in the soul not of the ruler but of the race."⁶⁶ This commitment to effect a deeper change in Indian society was driven not only by a desire to consolidate British power but also by the increasing strength of utilitarianism and evangelism within Britain itself. The former provided impetus for the improvement of living conditions and education in India. The latter brought missionaries seeking to propagate Christian morality in India. As Charles Grant expressed in an article contained in an 1832 parliamentary report on India, British rule is a question "not merely of increasing the security of the subjects and prosperity of the country, but of advancing social happiness, of meliorating the moral state of men, and of extending a superior light."67

Through what specific mechanisms did socialization take place? British efforts to effect change in Indian political culture were embodied or manifest in a wide range of policy tools. First, the Charter Act of 1813 was the first of several enactments that firmly established English as the primary language for the school system and government business. The spread of English made Western books and ideas accessible to educated Indians and made possible more extensive and meaningful contact between Indians and Englishmen. As Percival Spear noted, "The widespread knowledge of English provided an ideological bridge; ideas flowed over in the persons of British lawyers

66. J. A. Cramb, cited in Francis Hutchins, The lllusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 149.

67. Grant, cited in ibid., p. 5.

and officials, missionaries, and disinterested men of learning.... The essential fact is that these ideas did begin to take root."68

Second, the Indian judicial system was reformed along the British model. Beginning in 1835, English replaced Persian as the language of record. The principles and procedures of British law were also imported into India.⁶⁹ James Fitzjames Stephen held out high hopes for the effect of British law on Indian society: "The establishment of a system of law which regulates the most important part of the daily life of a people constitutes in itself a moral conquest, more striking, more durable, and far more solid than the physical conquest which renders it possible. It exercises an influence over the minds of the people in many ways comparable to that of a religion.... Our law is, in fact, the sum and substance of what we have to teach them.' '⁷⁰ The British also restructured the Indian education system, again relying on their own model. Sir Charles Wood's education dispatch of 1854 established universities in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, all of which adopted London's examination procedures.

These reforms and institutional changes led to the emergence of a new Indian middle class whose prosperity and professional success depended on its learning of English and adoption of British legal and business procedures.71 The growth and rising stature of this class of collaborators in tum played a central role in allowing British ideas and practices to take root in India. According to Spear, "Britain's supreme function has been that of a cultural germ carrier The introduction of the English language provided a vehicle for Western ideas, and English law a standard practice. Along with English literature came Western moral and religious ideas, and the admission of missionaries provided, as it were, a working model of Western moral precepts."72

To what extent did the British succeed in changing the norms and values shaping Indian political culture? During the nineteenth century, British rule deeply influenced the structure and normative orientation of Indian political life. Before the British presence, Indian politics was dominated by religious affiliation and practice, the caste system, and strong local and regional allegiances. By the end of the 1800s, Western notions of administrative efficiency and justice had led to the gradual secularization of politics; the importance of the caste system had declined somewhat; and the spread of English had helped overcome the political regionalism that had been perpetuated by linguistic diversity (some 179 distinct languages and 544 dialects had hampered communication). In short, British political values and practices

68. Percival Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, /740-1975, 2d ed. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 137.

69. Ibid., p. 205.

70. Stephen, cited in Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence, p. 126.

71. Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, pp. 2()(rl!.

72. Ibid., p. 7.

had intermingled with and, in some instances, replaced the traditional norms eroding under the pressure of colonialism.

As mentioned above, these changes were possible largely because of the emergence of a new political elite within India. British administration of India took place through a new class of collaborators consisting of English-speaking and Western-educated professionals. Trained within an education system introduced by the British, these individuals-bureaucrats, lawyers, doctors, and teachers-quickly rose to prominent positions within Indian society. Induced by the opportunities for advancement and indoctrinated by Western education, this new political elite came to believe in and espouse the values and norms articulated by the Raj. They thus provided a mechanism for socialization, a medium through which British values seeped into Indian political culture.

By the late 1800s, the osmosis and spread of Western political values and teachings had stimulated an increasingly strong movement for democracy and Indian independence.73 Given the principles embodied in the liberal notions imported to India, it is not surprising that the same educated elite co-opted by the British to facilitate their rule later became a key force behind the delegitimation of imperial domination. ⁷⁴ Yet even after the opposition movement grew strong, the depth of British penetration of Indian political culture was evident. As Anil Seal points out, "The new politicians were impeccably constitutional. [They] spoke highly of British justice. They asked God to bless the British Queen. They had friends inside the British parliament.' '75 This behavior suggests that the trajectory of British rule in India was shaped by the power of ideas as much as by military and economic might. The consolidation of British rule during the 1800s was due, at least in part, to a process of socialization. The observed changes in political values came about through policy coercion; that is, the transmission of ideas followed the forcible importation of Western political institutions and practices. Moreover, the collaborative elite was enticed by promises of financial or political gain. Nevertheless, India's political elite actually came to believe in Western values rather than simply mouthing acquiescence because of British coercion. And the subsequent rise of Indian nationalism and delegitimation of the British presence were also associated with changing beliefs, rather than with a changing constellation of military and economic power.

73. The gradual consolidation of British rule in the mid-1800s by no means removed all resistance to the colonial presence. The mutiny of 1857, which came as a great surprise to the British, demonstrated the potential for latent resentment to be mobilized. It was not until the last two decades of the century, however, that an organized nationalist movement began to systematically undermine British rule.

74. See Hutchins, The l/lusion of Permanence, pp. 190-91.

75. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 14-15.

Egypt. British rule in Egypt after the occupation in 1882 stands in stark contrast to the British experience in India. Neither in intent nor in deed did the British penetrate and restructure Egyptian political culture as they did in India. British elites, from the outset of the occupation, never intended to incorporate Egypt into the formal empire as a lucrative and permanent outpost. On the contrary, they viewed Egypt primarily as a strategic asset needed to guard the Suez Canal and the route to India. They assumed that after restoring stability to Egypt following the revolt of Colonel Arabi, they could withdraw without jeopardizing Britain's strategic or economic interests.76 The evangelical, moralistic, and normative orientation of British rule in India was strikingly absent from British policy in Egypt.

The British did not attempt to restructure the indigenous political, legal, and administrative apparatus through which Egypt was governed. They sought only to fine-tune and make more efficient the existing administrative apparatus. In Viscount Milner's words, "The object of the British officials has been, not to Anglicize the Egyptian bureaucracy in political opinion, but only to Anglicize it in spirit, to infuse into its ranks that uprightness and the devotion to duty which is the legitimate boast of the Civil Service of Great Britain."77 John Marlowe agreed that "British administration was merely added as a superstructure to the existing fabric of government."78

As a result, no new political elite emerged in Egypt. On the contrary, both before and during the occupation, the British relied on well-established landlords and merchants as their collaborators. "They adopted the expedient of attempting to raise standards of living without changing class structures," as Robert Tignor points out, and "they attempted to make authority felt without undermining the position of the traditional ruling classes." In short, “they governed behind these ruling classes."79The ruling classes cooperated with the British not because they believed in Western values or justice but, rather, because they benefited from their role as collaborators and from the loans and improvements in irrigation that came with the British presence. They were not drawn into or psychologically co-opted by British rule. The very mechanism through which socialization occurred in India-the creation of a new political elite-was never set in motion in Egypt.

The absence of significant reform in the Egyptian education and legal systems was indicative of the superficial nature of British rule. The British had only partial success in spreading the use of English throughout the

76. Robert Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, /882-19/4 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 24 and 48-49. See also Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 54.

77. Viscount Milner, England in Egypt (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), p. 290.

78. John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, /800-1953 (London: Cresset Press, 1954),

p. 251.

79. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, p. l05.

country.80 English-language newspapers did not proliferate in Egypt as they did in India. This limited the extent to which Western ideas and values were absorbed even by the educated elite. Furthermore, the education system changed little under British rule and was given a low priority in terms of government expenditure.81 Viscount Milner admitted that Britain did "very little for Egypt in the way of voluntary schools."82 The lack of universities was also a significant problem. The British, in order to restrict the spread of nationalism, actually opposed the expansion of the university system.83 Many Egyptians completed their secondary education but did not have the opportunity to attend university. They were therefore too well-qualified for manual work but lacked the credentials for government or administrative work. This created a large body of disaffected youth easily swayed by nationalist sentiment.84 The effect of British rule on the court system was similarly insignificant. Despite the importation of some Anglo-Indian legal procedures, the Egyptian judicial system continued to be modeled on that of the French.85

The superficial nature of British rule was also reflected in Britain's dependence on the cooperation of specific collaborators. During the early years of colonial rule, Khedive Tewfik played a key role in facilitating British administration. When Tewfik died in 1892, he was replaced by Abbas II, who was far less willing to cooperate with the British. Richard Cottam describes the result: "With the realization that Abbas II would not serve as the legitimating agent for the British presence ... the British established a different type of control system-one which relied far more on direct coercive instruments."⁸⁶ In 1893, Lord Cromer requested and was granted the first of several increases in the size of the British garrison. Moreover, traditional elites, who were no longer willing to cooperate with the British, were replaced by British personnel. The collaborative network was breaking down. Between 1896 and 1906, the number of British officials serving in Egypt rose from 286 to 662.⁸⁷ To cope with resistance movements, the British were forced to implement a rigorous security system in the countryside and hire some fifty thousand informants to report on developments in local villages. As Timothy Mitchell describes this system, the British "transformed modem military methods of inspection, communication and discipline into

80. Milner, England in Egypt, p. 301.

81. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, p. 319.

82. Milner, England in Egypt, p. 299. See also Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community,

p. 55.

83. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, p. 338.

84. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, p. 189.

85. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, pp. 123-37.

86. Richard Cottam, Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (Pitts• burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 239.

87. Ibid., p. 236.

an uninterrupted process of political power.' '88 Only ten years after the initial occupation, the British found themselves scrambling to keep pace with a nationalist movement that made colonial rule increasingly difficult and costly. The British thus attempted to rule Egypt through unadorned coercion and inducement. They sought to co-opt the traditional ruling elite by either forcing or inducing them to serve as peripheral collaborators. Yet once the benefits of cooperation with the British began to decrease, there was no corpus of beliefs or norms that had taken root in Egyptian society to justify or legitimate British rule and to counter the rise of nationalist and anti-British sentiment. As John Marlowe described this phenomenon, "The only moral justification for imperialism is the pax which accompanies the legions. Great Britain in Egypt tried to secure the presence of the legions without being prepared to enforce the pax." Britain initially enjoyed the privileges of occupation without paying the price but soon "destroyed the moral basis on which her position in Egypt rested."89 In 1914, when the use of coercion in the absence of efforts to socialize Egyptian elites proved insufficient to subdue the swelling tide of nationalism, Britain unilaterally declared Egypt a protectorate and imposed martial law. By 1922, however, the British cabinet realized that the situation was untenable and granted Egypt formal independence.

The imposition of foreign rule' unadorned by a corpus of beliefs and norms led to a period of occupation that was both difficult and relatively short-lived. Britain's experience of formal empire in India, though it also ended in acquiescence to nationalism, was far more durable and left a deeper impression on Indian society. The distinguishing feature of British hegemony in India was that Britain succeeded in building and socializing a new political elite, allowing it to penetrate and reshape Indian political culture.

Conclusion

In this article, we have attempted to characterize and shed light on a neglected component of hegemonic order-power as socialization-and have articulated a theoretical framework for thinking about when and how socialization functions effectively as a source of power in the international system. The intersection between theory and historical cases corroborates our three main hypotheses.

First, the case studies suggest that the timing of socialization and the extent to which it occurs are highly dependent on the efforts of the hegemon to propagate its conception of international order and also on the susceptibility of secondary states to a restructuring and redefining of the terms of domestic political legitimacy. It is principally in the aftermath of war or

88. Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97-98. .

89. Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations, p. 254.

colonial penetration that the hegemon articulates a new set of norms and that domestic political conditions make elites most susceptible to socialization. In the post-World War II case, the spread of U.S. norms was intimately tied to the tasks of reconstruction and coalition building. The reconstruction aid of the Marshall Plan and its ideological gift wrapping strengthened the hands of government elites standing against both left-wing and right-wing opposition to liberal multilateralism. Moreover, after the initial failure of coercive efforts to promote liberal multilateralism, U.S. officials grew more sensitive to European sovereignty and the need for European leaders to take the initiative in constructing a postwar order. It was only through struggle and compromise that the Europeans and Americans arrived at a consensus on the norms of the postwar order. A process of "thought reform," as Andrew Shonfield puts it, did take place, with the Europeans gradually shedding the norms of colonization and imperial preference.90 In the case of India, the British were able to legitimate their rule because the colonial presence led to the emergence and co-optation of a new professional class that quickly established its stature and political power within Indian society. The British manipulated the standards of domestic political legitimacy, replacing traditional standards with their own. In doing so, they were able to consolidate and legitimate their rule. In the case of Egypt, precisely because the British administration depended on traditional elites, there was little change in the standards of domestic legitimacy. There was no opportunity for the transmission of norms; the consequent absence of interaction between British rule and domestic politics hindered the emergence of legitimate domination.

Second, the case studies confirm that socialization is principally an elite and not a mass phenomenon. For norms to have a consequential effect on state behavior, they must take root within the elite community. Wilson did not succeed fully in shaping the peace process, since his package of liberal norms found substantial support in Britain and France only among the public and was not greeted with enthusiasm in elite circles. The successful spread of British norms in India resulted from the creation and co-optation of a new political elite. In contrast, the shallow and fragile nature of British rule in Egypt was a function of the British decision to govern through traditional elite channels.

Third, the case studies suggest that socialization comes about principally through external inducement or internal reconstruction and that normative persuasion is insufficient to drive the socialization process. Elites in secondary states come to believe in the norms and ideals articulated by the hegemon only injunction with the provision of material incentives or through the imposition of those norms via direct intervention. Although Wilson's

90. Andrew Shonfield, "International Economic Relations of the Western World: An Overview," in Andrew Shonfield, ed., International Economic Relations of the Western World,

/959-/97 I, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 98.

program found some followers in post•l918 Europe, its ultimate failure was at least partially due to the fact that it was not backed up with economic or military assistance. In Europe after World War II, U.S. offers of material aid and opportunities for coalitional realignment drove forward the establishment of a normative consensus. In India, a new political elite emerged at least in part because of the opportunities for political advancement and material gain that accompanied collaboration with the British.

Although socialization is triggered by coercion and material inducements, the process of socialization can lead to outcomes that are not explicable simply in terms of the exercise of coercive power. Socialization affects the nature, the costs, and the longevity of the interactions that shape hegemonic systems. In particular, socialization leads to the legitimation of hegemonic power in a way that allows international order to be maintained without the constant threat of coercion. In this regard, it may be instructive to study the waning of hegemony-and especially that of Pax Americana-in terms of the legacies of socialization as well as in terms of the decline of the hegemon's military and economic dominance. As we have noted, the importance of socialization is most likely to be observed during periods when the hegemon's coercive capacities are in decline. According to our argument, the spread of liberal multilateral norms among elites in the late 1940s has given the contemporary hegemonic order more durability than would be expected by those who focus exclusively on the distribution of material resources. The socialization of hegemonic power has left a loose normative consensus embedded in the rules and institutions of the postwar system. These rules and institutions should persist well beyond the inflection point of hegemonic decline. Pax Americana, nonetheless, is in decline, and we are left to reflect on the nature of the normative principles that might be used by a future hegemon to legitimate a new order.

______________________

“Those who are most effective in claiming the moral high ground have been able to rally their people, dehumanise the target and take what they want.” The Master Strategist, Ketan J. Patel, 2005

When a Prime Minister with political forces in a Democracy seek to ostracise, brand citizens disagreeing as malicious spreaders of misinformation, as “radical” “corrosive insidious forces”, subversive fifth columnists, seeking to undermine Democracy by starting a “cultural war” he and the socialist ‘progressive’ elites started years ago, utilising dialectic emotionalism, “pretentious diction, and high-flown rhetoric” doublespeak meant to make truth more palatable and assign inverse derogatory labels to those who object, using public and private organisations such as the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI) to silence citizens across Democratic media discourse platforms you know you have arrived at the doorstep of a 1984 Marxist regressive one thought gulag.

If we are to survive as Democracies in the West and not simply trade it for a shoddy tyranny of good intentions armed with Marxist deviance silencing paradigms which tear us internally apart and make us easy prey for tyranny of a different form, we cannot afford our humanity institutions to keep pouring out these destroyers of our biology/culture ideology.

The Voice is a means to an end, an end which cannot be voiced before they have the political power to enforce. Whatever form it takes it is not in the interest of preserving Equal Voice to Power Democracy nor increasing the quality of life for any Australian as it is a self-enhancement not a self-improvement strategy of an elite.

Why Christchurch, Why Queensland, Why violence is rising in the Western Democratic streets for the same the WOKE assumptions which failed in Afhganistan as elsewhere tearing their Democracies apart with their minutia over survival.

Why citizens not right-winger subversives are going to meet WOKE force of Ostracism with reactive force to Ostracise in turn. The ugly face of the WOKE

will be returned with vengence.

1984 inversion. In future the little libraries hidden behind walls will have the pre-Woke literature and history. Who would have thought the 1984 terror of big Brother would be upon us so soon.

Just waiting for the knock on the door from the WOKE Morality Police to take my Biggles.

Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict, Renanah Miles Joyce, April 01 2022

The WOKE sickening delusion they are saving Democracy rather than putting their dogma jackboot on its throut to silence citizens who desire different moral abstracts as a basis for achieving an improving quality of life.

https://reader.foreignaffairs.com/2023/02/28/how-democracy-can-win-3/content.html

How Democracy Can Win, The Right Way to Counter Autocracy, Foreign Affairs, By Samantha Power | February 28, 2023

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No Biology/Culture Ideology has a Right to Demand Absorption of their Systemic Terror-Genocide

Reading 'Socialization and hegemonic power' as to why deligitimising their own hegemon's power is the most stupid dangerous action the WOKE have/are perpetrating against their own Biology/Culture Ideology

Socialization and hegemonic power

Power as coercion and power as socialization

Developing theory of socialization in international relations

Historical cases studies

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